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INTRODUCTION 
On June 14, 1992, a group of armed men entered Jaskici, a vil-
lage in the Prijedor region of Bosnia.1  The group summoned Jaskici 
residents from their homes and separated the men from the women 
and children.2  The men were beaten and removed from the village, 
and after the group left the area, five men from Jaskici were found 
dead.3  In the first trial before the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), several witnesses identified Dusko 
Tadic as one of the armed men who had entered Jaskici, but none of 
them could specifically link him to these killings.4  Despite this lack of 
direct evidence, the ICTY Appeals Chamber held that Tadic could be 
found criminally responsible for the deaths of these five men.5 
Tadic’s liability in this case was based on the joint criminal en-
terprise (JCE) doctrine.  Though ICTY prosecutors now frequently 
employ this doctrine, it has proven controversial in the international 
community.  On one hand, the ICTY Appeals Chamber asserts that 
recognition of group criminality is essential for the enforcement of in-
ternational criminal law because “[m]ost of the time these [interna-
tional] crimes do not result from the criminal propensity of single in-
 
* J.D. and LL.M., Duke University School of Law. For helpful comments and suggestions, I 
thank Sara Sun Beale, Ralf Michaels, and the editors of the Duke Journal of Comparative & 
International Law. 
 1. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶ 178 (July 15, 1999). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. ¶ 181. 
 4. Id. ¶ 233. 
 5. For a detailed description of Tadic’s trial see MICHAEL P. SCHARF, BALKAN JUSTICE 
93-205 (1997). 
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dividuals but constitute manifestations of collective criminality.”6  On 
the other hand, as one critic of JCE liability has argued, “[w]hen JCEs 
are very large or have circuitous command structures, the accused 
and the triggerman can be far removed from each other” and “fair-
ness and the need to establish legitimacy oppose allowing JCE [liabil-
ity] to become a doctrine of guilt by association.”7  Some scholars 
have even argued that JCE liability “has the potential to stretch 
criminal liability to a point where the legitimacy of international 
criminal law will be threatened . . . .”8 
Despite this controversy, JCE liability is actually one of many 
schemes in both international and domestic law that base individual 
liability on conduct of a group.  This paper compares four prominent 
examples of such liability, and concludes that variations in these 
schemes correspond to particular characteristics of the groups and in-
dividuals targeted.  On this logic, the breadth of JCE liability is justi-
fied if the purpose of the tribunal requires broad constructions of in-
dividual criminal liability for group conduct. 
Part I of this paper summarizes the elements of JCE liability in 
the ICTY. Part II describes three similar doctrines in international 
and domestic law, compares them to JCE liability, and offers an ex-
planation of variations among the elements of each scheme. Finally, 
Part III  considers whether the broad scope of JCE liability can be 
justified in light of the conduct targeted by the ICTY. 
 
 6. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶ 191 (July 15, 1999).  Similarly, 
ICTY prosecutors argue that JCE liability is necessary to achieve the punishment of large-scale 
international crimes.  As stated by one former legal advisor at the ICTY’s Office of the Prosecu-
tor, “every instance of misconduct [before the ICTY] is a segment of a more widespread and 
systematic criminal activity and is perpetrated in execution of a precise criminal design.  The 
investigation of a single instance of misconduct should, therefore, be an opportunity to try to 
identify the criminal network to which it was related.”  Nicola Piacente, Importance of the Joint 
Criminal Enterprise Doctrine for the ICTY Prosecutorial Policy, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 446, 446 
(2005). 
 7. Allen O’Rourke, Recent Development: Joint Criminal Enterprise and Brdanin: Mis-
guided Overcorrection, 47 HARV. INT’L L. J. 307, 315 (2006). 
 8. Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal En-
terprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law, 93 CAL. 
L. REV. 75, 132 (2005). 
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I. JOINT CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE LIABILITY IN THE ICTY 
A. Introduction 
The JCE doctrine is not explicitly recognized in the Statute of 
the ICTY (ICTY Statute)9 or in its Rules of Procedure and Evi-
dence.10  In fact, the plain language of the ICTY Statute could be con-
strued to limit the liability of an individual defendant to his own ac-
tions: As article 7 provides, persons “who planned, instigated, 
ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, 
preparation or execution of [grave breaches of the Geneva Conven-
tions of 1949, war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity] 
shall be individually responsible for the crime.”11 
Despite this language of individual liability, the Appeals Cham-
ber has held that “joint criminal enterprise was provided for in the 
Statute of the Tribunal and . . . existed under customary international 
law [at the time of the Yugoslav conflict].”12  The Appeals Chamber 
has ruled that the plain language of the ICTY statute is not disposi-
tive because it “is not and does not purport to be . . . a meticulously 
detailed code providing explicitly for every possible scenario and 
every solution thereto.  It sets out in somewhat general terms the ju-
risdictional framework within which the Tribunal has been mandated 
to operate.”13  Finding that “all persons who participate in the plan-
ning, preparation or execution of serious violations of international 
humanitarian law contribute to the commission of the violation and 
are therefore individually responsible,” the Appeals Chamber has 
held that JCE liability falls within article 7.14 
Further, the Appeals Chamber regards JCE liability “not as a 
form of accomplice liability, but as a form of ‘commission’” under ar-
 
 9. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Se-
curity Council Resolution 808 (1993), presented 3 May 1993, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993) 
[hereinafter ICTY Statute]. 
 10. Rules of Procedure and Evidence, International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Per-
sons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the 
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 39 (Sept. 22, 2006), avail-
able at http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc-e/basic/rpe/IT032Rev39e.pdf. 
 11. ICTY Statute, supra note 9, arts. 2-5, 7 (emphasis added). 
 12. Prosecutor v. Milutinovic, Case No. IT-99-37-AR72, Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanic’s 
Motion Challenging Jurisdiction – Joint Criminal Enterprise, ¶ 18 (May 21, 2003). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. ¶ 19. 
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ticle 7.15  JCE liability may be distinguished from aiding and abetting 
liability based on the knowledge of the individual defendant: Where 
an individual “only knows that his assistance is helping a single per-
son to commit a single crime, he is only liable for aiding and abetting 
that crime . . . even if the principle perpetrator is part of a joint crimi-
nal enterprise involving the commission of further crimes.”16  How-
ever, if an individual “knows that his assistance is supporting the 
crimes of a group of persons involved in a [JCE] and shares that in-
tent, he may found criminally responsible for the crimes committed in 
furtherance of that common purpose as a co-perpetrator.”17 
B. Requirements for JCE liability 
The JCE doctrine actually encompasses three different forms of 
liability.  In all three, the prosecution must show (1) “[a] plurality of 
persons;” (2) “[t]he existence of a common plan, design or purpose 
which amounts to or involves the commission of a crime provided for 
in the [ICTY] Statute;” and (3) “[p]articpation of the accused in the 
common design.”18  For each type of JCE liability, the required show-
ing of mens rea differs.  Thus, the requirements of JCE liability may 
be divided into requirements for the group (a plurality of persons and 
a common purpose) and requirements for the individual (participa-
tion and mens rea). 
1. Group requirements 
The group requirements necessary for establishing JCE liability 
in the ICTY are minimal.  The first requirement, a plurality of per-
sons, may be satisfied by a relatively informal group.  As the Appeals 
Chamber has stated, the plurality of persons “need not be organized 
in a military, political, or administrative structure.”19  Thus, the plural-
ity of persons element is satisfied when the prosecution proves that 
the group “included the leaders of political bodies, the army, and the 
police who held power [in a given area]” without a showing that per-
sons in these disparate groups were acting together in an organized 
fashion.20 
 
 15. Id. ¶ 31. 
 16. Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-30/A-A, Judgment, ¶ 90 (Feb. 28, 2005). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶ 227 (July 15, 1999). 
 19. Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic, Case No. IT-98-32-A, Judgment, ¶ 100 (Feb. 25, 2004). 
 20. Prosecutor v. Stakic, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Judgment, ¶ 69 (Mar, 22, 2006). 
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The second requirement, the existence of a common purpose, 
may be established even if that purpose was not “previously arranged 
or formulated.”21  In these cases, “the purpose may materialise ex-
temporaneously and be inferred from the facts.”22  Generally, no for-
mal agreement is required to satisfy the common purpose element.23  
However, the common criminal purpose element is not satisfied if al-
leged JCE members committed crimes for reasons of personal re-
venge, rather than to effectuate a criminal purpose shared with oth-
ers, even when these crimes are committed systematically.24  
Therefore, in Prosecutor v. Limaj, though the Appeals Chamber 
found that soldiers of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) had “sys-
tematically beat[en] detainees [in a prison camp], committing the 
crimes of cruel treatment and torture,”25 the common purpose ele-
ment was not satisfied because the evidence did not rule out the pos-
sibility that these soldiers were acting for reasons of personal revenge, 
rather than to effect a common purpose of the KLA.26 
2. Individual requirements 
To be convicted of a crime by JCE, an individual must (1) have 
participated in the JCE and (2) have acted with the requisite mens 
rea.  The first requirement, participation, is fulfilled by a showing of 
minimal contribution to the group in question.  As the Appeals 
Chamber has stated, “once a participant in a joint criminal enterprise 
shares the intent of that enterprise, his participation may take the 
form of assistance or contribution with a view to carrying out the 
common plan or purpose.”27  Further, the presence of the accused 
when the crime is committed is not necessary to establish guilt in JCE 
liability.28  In fact, “the Prosecutor need not demonstrate that the ac-
cused’s participation is a sine qua non, without which the crimes could 
or would not have been committed.”29  For example, an ICTY trial 
 
 21. Vasiljevic, Case No. IT-98-32-A ¶ 100. 
 22. Id. 
 23. See Prosecutor v. Brdanian, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Judgment, ¶ 417 (Apr. 3, 2007). 
 24. Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-A, ¶¶ 113-115, (Sept. 27, 2007). 
 25. Id. ¶ 105. 
 26. Id. ¶¶ 112-117. 
 27. Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-A, Judgment, ¶ 81 (Sept. 17, 2003). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-30/A-A, Judgment, ¶ 98 (Feb. 28, 2005).  The 
Appeals Chamber has noted, however, that some cases will require a more substantial showing 
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chamber recently convicted a high-ranking police official, Milan 
Martic, of war crimes and crimes against humanity based on JCE li-
ability, though he was not present when the crimes were committed 
and was not a necessary element to their commission.30  The court 
found that Martic was part of a JCE with the common criminal pur-
pose of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity to dis-
place the non-Serb population in parts of the former Yugoslavia.31  
Martic was found guilty under the JCE doctrine because he had par-
ticipated in the crimes by “fueling the atmosphere of insecurity [in the 
regions] through radio speeches wherein he stated he could not guar-
antee the safety of the non-Serb population”32 and by “deliberately 
refrain[ing] from intervening against perpetrators who committed 
crimes against the non-Serb population.”33 
The mens rea requirement may be fulfilled in one of three ways, 
each constituting a different form of JCE liability.  In the first form of 
JCE liability, the prosecution must prove that the perpetrator acted 
with “the intent to perpetrate a certain crime.”34  In other words, the 
prosecutor must show that “the accused . . . voluntarily participate[d] 
in one aspect of the common design” and “the accused, even if not 
personally effecting the [crime] . . . intend[ed] this result.”35  For this 
type of JCE, “what matters . . . is not whether the person who carried 
out the actus reus of a particular crime is a member of the JCE, but 
whether the crime in question forms a part of the common purpose.”36  
However, when holding members of a JCE responsible for crimes 
committed by outsiders, “it has to be shown that the crime can be im-
puted to one member of the joint criminal enterprise, and that this 
member – when using a principal perpetrator – acted in accordance 
with the common plan.”37  Therefore, under this “basic” form of JCE 
liability, an individual defendant may be held responsible for the ac-
tions of a JCE if he participates in that enterprise with a plurality of 
 
of participation in order to convict an individual defendant of criminal acts under JCE liability.  
Id. ¶ 97. 
 30. Prosecutor v. Martic, Case No. IT-95-11-T, Judgment, ¶ 434 (June 12, 2007). 
 31. Id. at ¶ 442. 
 32. Id. at ¶ 450. 
 33. Id. at ¶ 451. 
 34. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶ 228 (July 15, 1999). 
 35. Id. ¶ 196. 
 36. Prosecutor v. Brdanian, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Judgment, ¶ 410 (Apr. 3, 2007). 
 37. Id. ¶ 413. 
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persons and has the specific intent to achieve a common purpose that 
violates the ICTY statute. 
The second form of JCE liability, the “systemic” form, is recog-
nized when an individual holds a position of authority in a military or 
administrative unit and participates in some way in an organized sys-
tem of criminality perpetrated by that unit.38  In this form of JCE li-
ability, the accused must have “personal knowledge of the system of 
ill-treatment” and “inten[d] to further this common concerted system 
of ill-treatment.”39  Because the enterprise implicated in this form of 
JCE may involve a large number of people, the Appeals Chamber has 
noted that mens rea must be “assessed in relation to the knowledge of 
a particular accused.”40  Specifically, 
[w]hat is natural and foreseeable to one person participating in 
a systemic [JCE] might not be natural and foreseeable to an-
other, depending on the information available to them.  Thus, 
participation in a systemic joint criminal enterprise does not 
necessarily entail criminal responsibility for all crimes, which, 
though not within the common purpose of the enterprise, were 
a natural or foreseeable consequence of the enterprise.  A par-
ticipant may be responsible for such crimes only if the Prosecu-
tion proves that the accused had sufficient knowledge such that 
the additional crimes were a natural and foreseeable consequence 
to him.41 
For example, under the systemic form of JCE liability, the court may 
hold a warden responsible for torture committed by others in his 
prison if the prosecution proves that the warden knew torture was 
taking place there but failed to stop it.42 
 
 38. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A ¶ 202. 
 39. Id. ¶ 228. 
 40. Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-30/A-A, Judgment, ¶ 86 (Feb. 28, 2005). 
 41. Id. (second emphasis added).  Though the ICTY’s statements of the mens rea required 
for systemic JCE liability are somewhat inconsistent in U.S. criminal law terms, a requirement 
of knowledge is probably the closest analogy.  The tribunal’s references to defendant’s “intent 
to further” a known system of ill treatment, see supra note 39 and accompanying text, suggest 
purposeful conduct under U.S. law.  MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a) (Proposed Official Draft 
1962).  However, holding a defendant liable for the “natural and foreseeable” consequences of 
the JCE’s activities, see supra 41 and accompanying text, is closer to the U.S. standard of reck-
lessness.  MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).  Since both state-
ments refer to the knowledge of the particular defendant—with respect to the system of ill 
treatment, and with respect to the particular activities of the JCE—the closest analogy in U.S. 
law is probably a mens rea of knowledge.  Id. § 2.02(2)(b). 
 42. Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-A, Judgment, ¶ 110 (Sept. 17, 2003). 
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The most controversial form of JCE liability, the extended form, 
is established where an individual manifests “a criminal intention to 
participate in a common criminal design” and “criminal acts other 
than those envisaged in the common criminal design are likely to be 
committed by other participants in the common design.”43  With re-
spect to this form of liability, two findings of mens rea are required: 
First, the accused must have the intention to participate in and 
contribute to the common criminal purpose.  Second, in order 
to be held responsible for crimes which were not part of the 
common criminal purposes, but which were nevertheless a 
natural and foreseeable consequence of it, the accused must 
also know that such a crime might be perpetrated by a member 
of the group, and willingly take the risk that the crime might 
occur by joining or continuing to participate in the enterprise.44 
This extended form of JCE liability is controversial because it allows 
the prosecution to impute criminal liability to individuals for crimes 
they neither committed nor knew were taking place. 
Tadic was convicted of the Jaskici killings under the extended 
form of JCE liability.  According to the Appeals Chamber, the group 
of armed men who entered the village shared the “common criminal 
purpose to rid the Prijedor region of the non-Serb population, by 
committing inhumane acts.”45  Though their purpose was not to kill all 
non-Serb men, the court found that Tadic “had been aware of [previ-
ous] killings accompanying the commission of inhumane acts against 
the non-Serb population.”46  Further, the Appeals Chamber found 
that Tadic “actively took part in this attack, rounding up and severely 
beating some of the men from Jaskici,” therefore fulfilling the par-
ticipation requirement.47  Finally, the mens rea requirement was satis-
fied because Tadic “was aware that the actions of the group of which 
he was a member were likely to lead to . . . killings, but he neverthe-
less willingly took that risk.”48  Anchored in these conclusions, the 
court found Tadic guilty of the murders of the five Jaskici men, based 
on his participation in the group believed to have committed the 
crimes. 
 
 43. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 204, 206 (July 15, 1999). 
 44. Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-30/A-A ¶ 83. 
 45. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A ¶ 231. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id ¶ 232. 
 48. Id. 
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II. COMPARISON 
Though JCE liability may appear unique at first glance, the doc-
trine actually resembles many other liability schemes in international 
and domestic law.  Specifically, a similar form of individual liability 
for group conduct was used in the international context in the Nur-
emberg proceedings, and is used in domestic law under the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),49 and under the 
provision prohibiting material support to foreign terrorists organiza-
tions (FTOs) under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act (AEDPA).50  This section briefly discusses the elements of liabil-
ity under these other criminal schemes and compares them with those 
of JCE liability in the ICTY.  In addition, this section links the differ-
ences in these elements of liability to differences in the type of crimi-
nal conduct targeted in each scheme.  To facilitate comparison with 
JCE liability, each scheme is divided into its group and individual re-
quirements for conviction. 
A. The Nuremberg proceedings 
The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg heard allega-
tions against twenty-two individual defendants and six organizations.51  
These organizations—the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party, the 
Gestapo, the SS, the SA, the Reich Cabinet, and the General Staff 
and High Command of the Nazi Party—were allegedly criminal due 
to their role in the perpetration of acts of aggression, war crimes, and 
crimes against humanity, the three substantive crimes within the tri-
bunal’s jurisdiction.52  During subsequent individual trials, also held in 
 
 49. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2004). 
 50. Pub. L. No. 104-32, 110 Stat. 1214. 
 51. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 393. 404 (Apr. 3, 
2007). 
 52. These organizations were prosecuted under article 9 of the London Charter, which 
provides, 
At the trial of any individual member of any group or organization the Tribunal may 
declare (in connection with any act of which the individual may be convicted) that the 
group or organization of which the individual was a member was a criminal organiza-
tion. 
After the receipt of the Indictment the Tribunal shall give such notice as it thinks fit 
that the prosecution intends to ask the Tribunal to make such declaration and any 
member of the organization will be entitled to apply to the Tribunal for leave to be 
heard by the Tribunal upon the question of the criminal character of the organization. 
The Tribunal shall have power to allow or reject the application. If the application is al-
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Nuremberg, members of organizations deemed criminal by the Nur-
emberg Tribunal were prosecuted for their association in the group.53  
These criminal organization proceedings differed from JCE liability 
in the ICTY, however, because membership in a criminal organiza-
tion was itself a crime at Nuremberg—individual members were not 
held liable for the crimes committed by other members of the organi-
zation, even if those crimes were foreseeable or even known.  In addi-
tion, because the criminal nature of the organization and the criminal 
liability of individual members were separate questions, the Nurem-
berg tribunal and subsequent courts determined individual and group 
criminality in bifurcated trials.  Since the ICTY often cites the Nur-
emberg tribunal as its predecessor in international law, this compari-
son is particularly relevant. 
1. Elements of liability 
a. Group requirements 
Recognizing that “the Tribunal should make such declaration of 
criminality so far as possible in a manner to insure that innocent per-
sons will not be punished” the tribunal defined criminal organizations 
narrowly.54  As stated in the judgment, 
A criminal organisation is analogous to a criminal conspiracy in 
that the essence of both is cooperation for criminal purposes. 
 
lowed, the Tribunal may direct in what manner the applicants shall be represented and 
heard. 
Agreement between by the Government of the United States of America, the Provisional Gov-
ernment of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of 
the Union of Soviet Socialists Republics for the Prosecution of the Major War Criminals of the 
European Axis and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, art. 9, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 
1544. 
 53. The crimes punishable under Control Council Law No. 10 were crimes against peace, 
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and membership in a criminal organization.  Control 
Council Law No. 10, Dec. 20, 1945, Control Council for Germany, Official Gazette, Jan. 31, 
1946, at 50, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/imt10.htm.  In fact, the crime of 
membership in a criminal organization was punishable by death.  Id.  Liability extended to both 
direct and indirect participants in criminal organizations: 
Any person . . . is deemed to have committed a crime . . . if he was (a) a principal or (b) 
was an accessory to the commission of any such crime or ordered or abetted the same 
or (c) took a consenting part therein or (d) was connected with plans or enterprises in-
volving its commission or (e) was a member of any organization or group connected with 
the commission of any such crime. 
Id. 
 54. JUDGMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE TRIAL OF 
GERMAN MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS  67 (1946). 
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There must be a group bound together and organised for a 
common purpose. The group must be formed or used in con-
nection with the commission of crimes denounced by the Char-
ter . . . . [T]hat definition should exclude persons who had no 
knowledge of the criminal purposes or acts of the organisation 
and those who were drafted by the State for membership, 
unless they were personally implicated in the commission of 
acts declared criminal[,] . . . the [Nuremberg] Charter as mem-
bers of the organisation. Membership alone is not enough to 
come within the scope of these declarations.55 
Thus, the criminal nature of organizations was judged based on (1) a 
common criminal purpose; (2) membership on a voluntary basis; and 
(3) knowledge.  Since the tribunal justified its criminal organization 
findings on judicial efficiency grounds, the group’s size also proved 
relevant. 
First, the tribunal found the common criminal purpose require-
ment fulfilled only when most of the organization’s members shared 
that purpose.  Thus, the Leadership Corps was deemed a criminal or-
ganization because its members were generally involved in “the Ger-
manisation of incorporated territory, the persecution of the Jews, the 
administration of the slave labour programe, and the mistreatment of 
prisoners of war.”56  The SA however, was not declared a criminal or-
ganization because, though some members “took part in the beer hall 
feuds and were used for street fighting in battles against political op-
ponents,” their participation was not shown to be “part of a specific 
plan to wage aggressive war.”57 
Voluntary participation, the tribunal’s second consideration, was 
not judged on the basis of absolute voluntariness but rather on a fail-
ure to protest assignment to a particular group.  Therefore, member-
ship in the Gestapo and the SD was deemed voluntary even though 
the members of these organizations “did not have a free choice of as-
signments within that organization and the refusal to accept a particu-
lar position . . . might have led to serious punishment.”58  Since “all 
members of the Security Police and SD joined the organization volun-
tarily under no other sanction than the desire to retain their positions 
 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 70. 
 57. Id. at 80. 
 58. Id. at 72-73. 
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as officials,” the tribunal found that membership in these organiza-
tions was sufficiently voluntary.59 
Finally, the tribunal did require that membership was known.  In 
declining to declare the General Staff and High Command a criminal 
organization, the Tribunal distinguished that group from the SS, stat-
ing, 
[w]hen an individual became a member of the SS . . . he did 
so . . . certainly with the knowledge that he was joining some-
thing.  In the case of the General Staff and High Command, 
however, he could not know he was joining group or organisa-
tion, for such organisation did not exist except in the charge of 
the Indictment.  He knew only that he had achieved a certain 
high rank in one of the three services, and could not be con-
scious of the fact that he was becoming a member of anything 
so tangible as a ‘group,’ as that word is common used.60 
The organization’s size also played a role in the tribunal’s crimi-
nal organization findings as a means of balancing of individual rights 
against judicial economy.  As the tribunal stated, “[w]here an organi-
zation with a large membership is used for such [criminal] purposes, a 
declaration [of criminality] obviates the necessity of inquiring as to its 
criminal character in the later trial of members who are accused of 
participating through membership in its criminal purposes and thus 
saves much time and trouble.  There is no such advantage in the case 
of a small group.”61  Therefore, the Reich Cabinet was not deemed a 
criminal organization because the group was “so small that members 
could be conveniently tried in proper cases without resort to a decla-
ration that the Cabinet of which they were members was criminal.” 62  
Under these criteria, the Nuremberg Tribunal declared only three or-
 
 59. Id. at 73.  Similarly, though the SA was not deemed a criminal organization at Nurem-
berg, the tribunal did determine that its membership was voluntary despite the fact that some 
officials were transferred to the SA without their knowledge. Id. at 79.  Their membership was 
deemed voluntary because “the Tribunal [was] not satisfied that the members in general en-
deavored to protest against this transfer or that there was any evidence, except in isolated cases, 
of the consequences of refusal.”  Id. 
 60. Id. at 82-83. 
 61. Id. at 81. 
 62. Id.  The cabinet had an estimated 48 members, eight of whom were dead and 17 of 
whom were on trial before the Nuremberg Tribunal.  Id.  Since declaring the Cabinet a criminal 
organization would therefore play a role in the cases of only 23 individuals, the tribunal declared 
that “nothing would be accomplished to expedite or facilitate their trials by declaring the Reich 
Cabinet to be a criminal organization.”  Id. 
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ganizations criminal: the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party, the Ge-
stapo/SD and the SS.63 
b. Individual requirements 
To convict individuals of membership in an organization deemed 
criminal by the Nuremberg Tribunal, courts required a showing that 
the individual knew of the organization’s criminal activities but did 
not require a showing that the defendant had participated in or con-
tributed to the organization’s crimes.64  Therefore, some defendants 
were convicted of a criminal offense simply because they maintained 
membership in an organization despite knowledge of its criminal pur-
pose.  For example, Joseph Altstoetter, a judge in the Bavarian and 
Reich Ministries of Justice and a member of the legal staff of the SS 
main office, was convicted of membership in criminal organization 
because “the activities of the SS and the crimes which it commit-
ted . . . are of so wide a scope that no person of the defendant’s intel-
ligence . . . could have been unaware of its illegal activities, particu-
larly a member of the organization from 1937 to the surrender.”65  As 
the tribunal further explained, 
Altstoetter not only had contacts with the high ranking officials 
of the SS . . . but was himself a high official in the Ministry of 
Justice stationed in Berlin from June 1943 until the surrender.  
He attended conferences of the department chiefs in the Minis-
try of Justice and was necessarily associated with the officials of 
the ministry, including those in charge of penal matters.66 
 
 63. The Tribunal declined to apply that title to the SA, the Reich Cabinet, and the General 
Staff and High Command.  The Tribunal did not, however, specifically require that members of 
these organizations would not be prosecuted in subsequent proceedings. 
 64. In reality, however, most individuals found guilty of membership in a criminal organi-
zation were also found guilty of directly committing war crimes or crimes against humanity, so a 
participation requirement would have been satisfied.  Karl Brandt, for example, a physician and 
a member of the SS, was convicted of war crimes and crimes against humanity for his participa-
tion in medical experiments on prisoners of war and concentration camp victims.  INT’L 
MILITARY TRIBUNAL, 2 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY 
TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 189-98 (William S. Hein & Co. 1997) 
(1952) [hereinafter TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS].  In finding Brandt also guilty of the crime of 
membership in the SS, the court simply noted that Brandt had become “a member of the or-
ganization in July 1934 and remained in this organization at least until April 1945.  As a member 
of the SS he was criminally implicated in the commission of war crimes and crimes against hu-
manity.”  Id. at 198. 
 65. 3 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 64, at 1175. 
 66. Id. 
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As the court noted, “[s]urely whether or not he took part in such ac-
tivities or approved of them, he must have known of that part which 
was played by an organization of which he was an officer . . . . Not-
withstanding these facts, he maintained his friendly relations with the 
leaders of the SS.”67  On these facts, Altstoetter was convicted of 
membership in a criminal organization.68 
Other individuals were convicted because their membership had 
by itself benefited the organization.  For example, in The Flick Case, 
defendants Friedrich Flick and Otto Steinbrinck were both charged 
with the crime of membership in the SS.  Each defendant had con-
tributed more than 100,000 Reichsmarks for cultural projects and 
other “special purposes” of Heinich Himmler, Reichsfuehrer of the 
SS, and each had participated in a small group called the Friends of 
Himmler.69  Despite their similar monetary contributions and partici-
pation, the court found Steinbrinck, but not Flick, guilty of member-
ship in a criminal organization.  As the tribunal explained, Flick had 
joined the SS and made donations to Himmler partially to compen-
sate for his prior public support of Hitler’s political rivals.70  Stein-
brink, on the other hand, was “an outstanding naval officer of the 
First World War [who was] respected and admired by the public” and 
who had been a member of the organization in a purely honorary 
fashion.71  Thus, in finding Steinbrinck guilty of membership in the SS, 
the tribunal found that he be “justly reproached for voluntarily lend-
ing his good reputation to an organization whose reputation was 
bad.”72 
 
 67. Id. at 1176. 
 68. Id. at 1177. 
 69. 6 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 64, at 1219-21.  The court declined to base 
liability on monetary contributions, finding that “[t]he giving began long before the war at a 
time when the criminal activities of the SS, if they had begun, were not generally known.”  Id. at 
1220.  In addition, the prosecution did not establish that “any part of the money was directly 
used for the criminal activities of the SS.”  Id.  However, as the court stated, 
It is reasonably clear that some of the funds were used purely for cultural purposes.  But 
during the war and particularly after the beginning of the Russian campaign we cannot 
believe that there was much cultural activity in Germany . . . . It is a strain upon credu-
lity to believe that [Himmler] needed or spent annually a million Reichsmarks solely for 
cultural purposes or that the members of the Circle [Friends of Himmler] could rea-
sonably believe that he did. 
Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 1221. 
 72. Id. at 1222. 
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2. Comparison and explanation 
Generally, as compared to JCE liability in the ICTY, the Nur-
emberg Tribunal’s analysis was more nuanced at the group level but 
more lenient at the individual level.  With respect to the group re-
quirements, the Nuremberg Tribunal’s consideration of voluntary 
membership and group size are generally absent from the ICTY’s 
JCE analysis.  However, since the tribunal’s criminal organization 
findings fixed the criminality of individuals tried in subsequent pro-
ceedings, the imposition of rigid requirements at the group level is 
logical.  In the ICTY, on the other hand, even when one member of a 
JCE is convicted of a crime, other members may not be held liable if 
they do not fulfill the mens rea and participation elements.73  The in-
dividual requirements for criminal liability at Nuremberg, however, 
were more lenient than those of the ICTY because individuals who 
had not actually participated in any criminal activity nevertheless 
could be convicted of a crime for their membership in a criminal or-
ganization.  The Nuremberg tribunal’s findings are therefore charac-
terized by rigid group requirements and lax individual requirements. 
This liability framework reflects the underlying purposes of the 
criminal organization findings in the Nuremberg Tribunal and subse-
quent individual trials.  Organizations were included among the ac-
cused at Nuremberg because, as stated by Robert Jackson, the U.S. 
Chief Prosecutor, “organizations indoctrinated and practiced violence 
and terrorism.  They provided the systematized, aggressive, and disci-
plined execution throughout Germany and the occupied countries of 
the plan for the crimes [within the jurisdiction of the Nuremberg Tri-
bunal].”74  Therefore, “[i]nsofar as the Charter of [the Nuremberg] 
Tribunal contemplates a justice of retribution, it is obvious that it 
could not overlook these organized instruments and instigators of 
past crimes.”75  However, because the proceedings at Nuremberg were 
intended to punish the leaders of the Nazi atrocities without vilifying 
the entire German people, subsequent individual trials imposed very 
strong knowledge requirements.  Finally, a participation requirement 
may have been absent from these trials because this form of liability 
was relatively new or because the scheme was intended to indict those 
 
 73. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text. 
 74. 8 NUREMBERG TRIAL PROCEEDINGS 355. 
 75. Id. at 356. 
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who knew of but did not prevent the atrocities, rather than those who 
actually committed them. 
B. RICO 
RICO prosecutions in U.S. law also base individual criminal li-
ability on group participation.76  Section 1962 of RICO prohibits three 
different activities: As the statute provides, 
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any in-
come derived . . . from a pattern of racketeering activity . . . to 
use or invest . . any part of such income . . in the acquisition 
of . . . any enterprise. 
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of 
racketeering activity . . . to acquire or maintain  . . . any interest 
in or control of any enterprise. 
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associ-
ated with any enterprise . . . to conduct or participate . . . in the 
conduct of [an] enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racket-
eering activity.77 
Section 1962(d) also criminalizes conspiracy to commit any of these 
three substantive offenses.78 “Racketeering activity” under the statue 
includes murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, deal-
ing in chemical substances or obscene matter, and a variety of other 
state and federal crimes.79 
Comparing RICO with JCE liability in the ICTY is particularly 
useful because defendants charged under both schemes may be far 
removed from the crime for which they are being prosecuted.  In ad-
dition, a comparison to RICO provides a useful analogy in domestic 
law to the ICTY’s doctrine. 
 
 76. In addition to imposing criminal liability, RICO imposes civil liability.  NORMAN 
ABRAMS & SARA SUN BEALE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 477 (4th ed. 
2006).  Because  “the number of cases . . . in which private civil plaintiffs seek to invoke RICO 
dwarfs the criminal caseload,” the interpretation of this statute has occurred primarily in the 
civil context.  Id. 
 77. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2004). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. § 1961. 
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1. Elements of liability 
a. Group requirements 
To convict an individual for RICO violations, the prosecution 
must prove the existence of the requisite group, called an enterprise.  
Two types of enterprises are recognized under the RICO statute: le-
gal entities and associations-in-fact.  As the statute provides, an en-
terprise “includes any individual, partnership, corporation, associa-
tion, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals 
associated in fact although not a legal entity.”80  The Supreme Court 
has construed the “enterprise” requirement broadly, stating “[t]here 
is no restriction upon the associations embraced by the definition,”81 
and recognizing that the enterprise requirement may be fulfilled by 
both legitimate and illegitimate organizations82 and by organizations 
with ideological goals and those with economic motives.83 
Though circuit courts differ on the exact characteristics of RICO 
“enterprises,” most require some degree of structure.84  As the Eighth 
Circuit has stated, “an enterprise must have an ‘ascertainable struc-
ture’ distinct from that inherent conduct of a pattern of racketeering 
activity.”85  Similarly, according to the Seventh Circuit, “ [a] RICO en-
terprise is ‘an ongoing ‘structure’ of persons associated through time, 
joined in purpose, and organized in a manner amenable to hierarchi-
cal or consensual decision-making.’”86  An enterprise that is a legal 
entity, rather than association-in-fact, generally satisfies these re-
quirements because “[a] legal entity necessarily has some built-in le-
 
 80. Id. 
 81. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981). 
 82. Id. at 580-601.  In fact, the Court saw both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises as in-
timately related: “Accepting that the primary purpose of RICO is to cope with the infiltration of 
legitimate business, applying the statute in accordance with its terms, so as to reach criminal en-
terprises, would seek to deal with the problem at its very source.”  Id. at 591. 
 83. Nat’l Org. for Women v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 252 (1994). 
 84. As the Seventh Circuit noted, “[t]here must be some structure, to distinguish an enter-
prise from a mere conspiracy, but there need not be much.”  Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 
1379 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 85. United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647, 665 (8th Cir. 1982).  But see United States v. 
Patrick, 248 F.3d  11, 19 (1st Cir. 2001) (rejecting structure as a requirement for RICO enter-
prises). 
 86. Richmond v. Nationwide Casse L.P., 52 F.3d 640, 644 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting Jennings 
v. Emy, 910 F.2d 1434, 1440 (7th Cir. 1990)).  The Fourth Circuit has used similar language: 
“The hallmark concepts that identify RICO enterprises are ‘continuity, unity, shared purpose 
and identifiable structure.’”  United States v. Fiel, 35 F.3d 997, 1003 (4th Cir. 1994) (quoting 
United States v. Griffin, 660 F.2d 996, 1000 (4th Cir. 1981)). 
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gal structure and organizational features.”87  Courts have held that the 
RICO enterprise requirement is fulfilled by associations-in-fact in-
cluding street gangs88 and motorcycle clubs,89 but not by a string of 
business entities90 or groups lacking decision-making or profit-sharing 
mechanisms.91 
b. Individual requirements 
In addition to the enterprise requirement, RICO prosecutions 
must establish a pattern of racketeering activities92 and the appropri-
ate relationship between the defendant and the enterprise.  With re-
spect to the “pattern” element, the statute “requires at least two acts 
of racketeering activity” that are committed within ten years.93  Ac-
cording to the Supreme Court, the statute “does not so much define a 
pattern of racketeering activity as state a minimum necessary condi-
tion for the existence of such a pattern.”94  Therefore, in addition to 
finding two racketeering acts within ten years, the Court requires a 
showing that these acts bear a relationship to each other and exhibit 
 
 87. ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 76, at 496. 
 88. United States v. Nascimento, 491 F.3d 25, 33 (1st Cir. 2007).  The gang was deemed an 
enterprise because its members “used a shared cache of firearms that were regarded as property 
of the gang,” “self-identified as belonging to an organization,” and “kept tabs on one another 
and informed one another when things would be ‘hot’ because of a recent shooting.”  Id. 
 89. United States v. Fiel, 35 F.3d 997, 1004 (4th Cir. 1994).  The motorcycle club was organ-
ized “for the purpose of riding motorcycles and drinking beer.”  Id.  Further, “[t]he group had 
officers and by-laws; members passed through various levels of membership . . . . It was a con-
tinuing entity, with some members retiring as new members joined.  The club raised money 
through dues, fines, raffle tickets and tickets to club-sponsored parties. A percentage of each 
chapter’s revenue went to the national club.”  Id. 
 90. Richmond, 52 F.3d at 645.  In Richmond, the plaintiff alleged that she had been forced 
to buy insurance beyond her needs by an enterprise consisting of the car dealership, the insur-
ance provider, and other unnamed entities.  Id. The court found that “such a nebulous, open-
ended description” did not satisfy the enterprise requirement.  Id. 
 91. Wagh v. Metris Direct, Inc., 363 F.3d 821, 831 (9th Cir. 2003).  The plaintiff in Wagh 
alleged mail fraud based on erroneous billing of his credit card by an enterprise consisting of his 
credit card issuer and the defendant bank.  Id. at 825.  His § 1962(c) claim was dismissed be-
cause he failed to allege “a decision-making structure for the enterprise ‘beyond that which was 
inherent in the acts of racketeering activity’” or a system for distributing the proceeds from the 
alleged fraud.  Id. at 831 (quoting Chang v. Chen, 80 F.3d 1293, 1300 (9th Cir. 1996)). 
 92. The pattern of racketeering activities may also help establish the existence of the requi-
site group.  As the Fourth Circuit noted, “[w]here . . . the enterprise charged is a wholly criminal 
one, proof of its existence may overlap proof of the connecting-pattern of racketeering activity, 
but ‘proof of one does not necessarily establish the other.’”  United States v. Griffin, 660 F.2d 
996, 999 (4th Cir. 1981) (quoting United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981)). 
 93. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2006). 
 94. H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 237 (1989). 
GIBSON_FMT2.DOC 10/15/2008  2:21:29 PM 
2008] TESTING THE LEGITIMACY OF THE JCE DOCTRINE 539 
 
characteristics of continuity.95  Specifically, “the relationship that [the 
acts] bear to each other or to some external organizing principle . . . 
must render[] them ‘ordered’ or ‘arranged.’”96  Further, “[a] RICO 
pattern may surely be established if the related predicates themselves 
involve a distinct threat of long-term racketeering activity, either im-
plicit or explicit.”97  Therefore, a pattern of racketeering activity is es-
tablished under RICO based on a showing of two or more acts of 
racketeering that fall in an arrangement and involve a threat of long-
term racketeering activity. 
In addition, since RICO § 1962 subjects persons, not enterprises, 
to liability, the appropriate relationship between the racketeering en-
terprise and the person charged must also be established.  However, 
since § 1961 defines a person as “any individual or entity capable of 
holding a legal or beneficial interest in property,” RICO defendants 
need not be natural persons.  Further, under subsections (a) and (b) 
of § 1962, defendant “persons” are not distinguished from the enter-
prise, so that a single entity can be charged as both the person and the 
enterprise.98  Most criminal RICO cases proceed under subsection (c) 
of § 1962, however, which distinguishes the enterprise from the per-
son who “conduct[s] or participate[s], directly or indirectly, in the 
conduct of such enterprise’s affairs. . . .”99 
Finally, the conspiracy provision in § 1962(d) expands the liabil-
ity of an individual defendant to include the crimes of coconspirators, 
even if that defendant did not commit or even participate in these 
crimes.  In fact, “[t]he RICO conspiracy provision . . . is even more 
comprehensive than the general conspiracy offense” because “[t]here 
 
 95. These requirements are based on a statement from the legislative history of the statute: 
“The target of [RICO] is thus not sporadic activity.  The infiltration of legitimate business nor-
mally requires more than one ‘racketeering activity’ and the threat of continuing activity to be 
effective.  It is this factor of continuity plus relationship which combines to produce a pattern.”  
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 496 n.14 (1985) (quoting S. REP. NO. 91-617, at 
158 (1969)). 
 96. H.J., Inc., 492 U.S. at 238 (citing 11 Oxford English Dictionary 357 (2d ed. 1989)). 
 97. Id. at 242.  “[T]he threat of continuity is sufficiently established where the predicates 
can be attributed to a defendant operating as a part of a long term association that exists for 
criminal purposes” or “where it is shown that the predicates are a regular way of conducting the 
defendant’s ongoing legitimate business. . . .”  Id. at 242-43. 
 98. ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 76, at 505. 
 99. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2006). As the Seventh Circuit has stated, this distinction is made un-
der subsection (c) because “[t]he use of the terms ‘employed by’ and ‘associated with’ appears 
to contemplate that a person distinct from the enterprise.”  Haroco, Inc. v. Am. Nat’l Bank & 
Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 400 (7th Cir. 1984). 
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is no requirement of some overt act or specific act” in § 1962(d).100  As 
the Supreme Court has noted, “[a] conspirator must intend to further 
an endeavor which, if completed, would satisfy all of the elements of a 
substantive criminal offense, but it suffices that he adopt the goal of 
furthering or facilitating the criminal endeavor.”101  Therefore, a de-
fendant who is acquitted of substantive RICO charges may still be 
convicted of conspiring to violate the statute under § 1962(d) so long 
as a coconspirator committed substantive violations of the statute.102 
2. Comparison and explanation 
In some ways, the RICO enterprise requirements are similar to 
the group findings in the ICTY.  In both schemes, the existence of the 
requisite group is determined in the same proceeding as individual li-
ability.  In addition, the characteristics of enterprises in RICO and 
JCEs in the ICTY are relatively fluid.  RICO is more demanding than 
the ICTY’s JCE doctrine, however, because RICO enterprises must 
exhibit structure and continuity, elements that are generally absent in 
the ICTY’s findings of a simple plurality of persons with a common 
criminal purpose.  Though RICO’s conspiracy liability resembles the 
JCE doctrine because both hold individuals liable based on crimes 
committed by other group-members, the RICO offense still differs 
because defendants are found guilty of conspiring to violate RICO, 
not for the coconspirator’s substantive RICO offense.103  With respect 
to the individual requirements, however, RICO is very different from 
JCE liability because, in the first two forms of RICO liability, the en-
terprise or group itself may be liable for the criminal activities of its 
members.  The defining characteristic of RICO liability, then, is the 
blending of the enterprise with its individual members. 
Such blending of individual and group elements was necessary in 
order to combat the crime targeted in RICO. Government research 
conducted before the statute was enacted characterized the groups 
carrying out organized crime as both “highly structured, separately 
identifiable organization[s]” and “multiple local groups, not necessar-
 
 100. United States v. Salinas, 522 U.S. 52, 63 (1997). 
 101. Id. at 65. 
 102. Id. at 66. 
 103. This distinction may be immaterial, however, because punishments under § 1962(d) are 
as harsh as under the substantive provisions of the statute. 
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ily organized under a unified, nationwide hierarchy.”104  Existing 
criminal law had proven ineffective in preventing these large-scale ac-
tivities because it punished only individual, low-level perpetrators 
who were easily replaced.  By enacting RICO, Congress sought “the 
eradication of organized crime in the United States by strengthening 
the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process, by establishing new 
penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new 
remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in or-
ganized crime.”105  Therefore, based on this goal, the enterprise re-
quirement in RICO was interpreted broadly to include both legiti-
mate and illegitimate enterprises, as well as those driven by 
ideological as well as economic goals.  Further, because the organized 
crime groups as well as their individual members were the targets of 
RICO enactments, the first two forms of liability extend to include 
the RICO enterprise as well as its individuals. 
C. AEDPA 
Individual liability is also based on group conduct in the AEDPA 
provisions prohibiting material support to groups deemed FTOs.106  
Like the “criminal organization” findings in the Nuremberg Tribunal, 
the finding of group and individual criminality is bifurcated.  First, the 
Secretary of State designates organizations FTOs for the purposes of 
the statute. Second, subsequent proceedings determine the individual 
liability of those allegedly providing material support to these organi-
zations.  Unlike defendants in the ICTY, these individuals are not 
held responsible for the crimes of FTOs—they are punished only for 
supporting such organizations.  Since the material support provisions 
of the AEDPA constitute a relatively recent attempt to shape U.S. 
law to address an emerging threat, this statute is particularly relevant 
to a discussion of JCE liability in the ICTY. 
 
 104. PAUL A. BATISTA, CIVIL RICO PRACTICE MANUAL 22-23 (2d. ed. 1997).  To support 
this proposition, Batista cites THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967), a report 
written by the Katzenbach Commission, created by President Lyndon Johnson to investigate the 
effectiveness of existing law enforcement and to make recommendations for changes at the na-
tional, state, and local levels.  Exec. Order No. 11,236. 
 105. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970). 
 106. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2006). 
GIBSON_FMT2.DOC 10/15/2008  2:21:29 PM 
542 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 18:521 
 
1. Elements of liability 
a. Group requirements 
Under the material support provisions of AEDPA, the Secretary 
of State, rather than a court, makes the requisite group determina-
tion.107  The Secretary may declare an organization an FTO based on 
three criteria: 
(A) the organization is a foreign organization 
(B) the organization is engaged in terrorist activity . . . or re-
tains the capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or 
terrorism; and 
(C) the terrorist activity or terrorism of the organization threat-
ens the security of United States nationals or the national secu-
rity of the United States.108 
Terrorist activity under AEDPA includes “premeditated, politically 
motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-
national groups or clandestine agents.”109 
Though courts do not designate organizations as FTOs, they do 
hear challenges to these designations upon disclosure.  After the Sec-
retary of State publishes an FTO designation, the organization 
deemed an FTO has thirty days to challenge its designation in court.110  
If this time period passes without challenge, the issue may not be re-
litigated in future proceedings.111  Courts have generally given great 
deference to the FTO designation procedure, upholding it against a 
number of constitutional challenges112 and finding that the Secretary 
of State’s determination of a threat to U.S. security under the statute 
is nonjusticiable because “it is beyond the judicial function of a court 
to review foreign policy decisions of the Executive Branch.”113 
 
 107. 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (2004). 
 108. Id. 
 109. 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2) (2006).  The Secretary is authorized to use classified informa-
tion in determining whether a particular group should be designated a FTO under the statute, 
though this information may be disclosed to a court for in camera proceedings if the designation 
is challenged.  8 U.S.C. § 1189 (2004). 
 110. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(c) (2005). 
 111. Id. 
 112. E.g., United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 329 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that the 
prosecution for material support for FTOs does not violate the First Amendment right to free-
dom of association); United States v. Marzook, 383 F.Supp 2d. 1056, 1067-68 (N.D. Ill. 2005) 
(upholding FTO determinaiton in a due process challenge). 
 113. People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 182 F.3d 17, 23 (D.C. Cir 1999). 
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If the group does not assert a timely challenge to the designation, 
or if the designation is upheld, an FTO determination is effective until 
revoked by the Secretary of State or by Congress.114  Courts have up-
held the conclusiveness of the Secretary of State’s FTO determina-
tions in prosecutions of individual defendants for material support of 
these organizations, finding that the opportunity to challenge the des-
ignation provided in the statute is sufficient to fulfill constitutional 
requirements.115  Forty-two organizations are currently designated as 
FTOs, including HAMAS, the Continuity Irish Republican Army, 
and the United Self-Defense Forces of Columbia.116 
b. Individual requirements 
Once an organization is deemed an FTO by the Secretary of 
State, individuals may be prosecuted for providing material support 
to such organization.  In order to convict an individual defendant, the 
prosecution must establish both knowledge and participation.  The 
knowledge requirement is fulfilled if the prosecution shows the de-
fendant knew that: (1) “the organization is a designated terrorist or-
ganization,” (2) “the organization has engaged or engages in terrorist 
activity,” or (3) “the organization has engaged or engages in terror-
ism.”117 
The participation element of the offense, providing material sup-
port, may be established by either financial or physical support.  As 
the statute provides, material support includes 
any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including cur-
rency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial 
services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safe-
houses, false documentation or identification, communications 
equipment, facilities, weapons, legal substances, explosives, 
personal transportation and other physical assets, except medi-
cine or religious materials.118 
For example, under this statute, individuals have been charged with 
material support for FTOs for collecting and donating money to or-
 
 114. 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (2005). 
 115. United States v. Afshari, 426 F.3d 1150, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 116. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM (2007), 
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/82738.htm. 
 117. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2004) (citations omitted). 
 118. Id. (referring to 18 U.S.C. § 2339A). 
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ganizations deemed FTOs119 and for providing a channel of communi-
cations to FTOs.120 
2. Comparison and explanation 
Though the determination of the requisite group under the 
AEDPA is very different from the ICTY’s JCE determinations, the 
individual requirements are actually relatively similar.  On one hand, 
the AEDPA group requirements are more inclusive than those ap-
plied in JCE liability because groups that merely have the capability 
of carrying out terrorist activities are designated FTOs, as well as 
those who actually carry out such activities.  On the other hand, these 
group determinations are more exacting than those in the ICTY be-
cause groups are limited to foreign organizations engaged in one par-
ticular type of activities—terrorism—and this activity must threaten 
U.S. security.  The basic individual requirements for material support 
under AEDPA, however, are the same as those for JCE liability in 
the ICTY—both require a degree of participation and the requisite 
mens rea.  Unlike in the ICTY, however, individuals charged with ma-
terial support for FTOs are not held responsible for every act of the 
group.  Instead, as the Ninth Circuit has specifically noted, “[d]onor 
defendants are penalized [only] for the criminal act of support.”121 
As with the other forms of liability discussed, the differences in 
these elements can be explained by examining the conduct targeted in 
AEDPA’s material support provisions.  Rather than punishing or-
ganization members who have already completed their criminal pur-
poses, the AEDPA material support provisions seek to prevent acts 
of terrorism by prosecuting those who would facilitate these acts 
through their monetary and other support.  In other words, the 
AEDPA provision prohibiting material support to terrorism “is pri-
marily aimed at cutting off the supply of money and other resources 
 
 119. United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 326 (4th Cir. 2004).  Defendants in this case 
were convicted of providing material support for terrorism.  Id. 
 120. United States v. Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d 348, 356-57 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).  Defendants in this 
case were not convicted because the court found the statute was unconstitutionally vague in its 
prohibition of the provision of “communications equipment.”  Id. at 357-58. 
 121. Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 1122, 1132 (9th Cir. 2007).  As the 
court has further explained, the provision “cannot be invoked to punish the donor defendant for 
crimes committed by the donee foreign terrorist organization.  A person cannot be convicted of 
murder under section 2339B(a) if the foreign terrorist organization committed an act of terror-
ism that took innocent lives.”  Id. 
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to terrorist groups.”122  Therefore, the designation of a foreign terror-
ist organization remains discrete from the determination of individual 
liability so that individuals who may be supporting these organiza-
tions have notice of the criminality of their conduct. 
Therefore, the JCE doctrine is not a form of liability unique to 
the ICTY.  Several other schemes in both international and domestic 
law also target individuals for group conduct, particularly the Nurem-
berg proceedings, RICO, and AEDPA.  However, the scope of liabil-
ity under each scheme differs according to the particular threat tar-
geted.  Therefore, the legitimacy of the JCE doctrine depends on 
whether the conduct that the ICTY seeks to address justifies that doc-
trine’s breadth. 
III. LEGITIMACY OF JCE LIABILITY 
Generally, the elements of JCE liability in the ICTY may be con-
strued as a response to the decentralized nature of the Yugoslav con-
flict, the difficulty of evidence-gathering in wartime, and the need to 
punish past atrocities rather than prevent future crimes. 
According to a United Nations (UN) report, prior to 1993, the 
Yugoslav conflict “was characterized by a multiplicity of combatant 
forces . . . sometimes operating under no established command and 
control.”123  Paramilitary groups involved in the conflict included spe-
cial forces, local police forces, and local armed civilians.124  During the 
conflict, special forces “usually operate[d] under the command of a 
named individual and apparently with substantial autonomy . . . . 
Many special forces answer[ed] only to senior political officials in the 
respective governments.  Such relationships [were] frequently based 
on personal political allegiance and are not always publicly known.”125  
Further, “[s]pecial forces are apparently accountable only to senior 
political officials of the government which they serve.  Little is known 
about their order of battle except that restraint of these units by the 
regular army is conspicuously absent.”126 
 
 122. NORMAN ABRAMS, ANTI-TERRORISM AND CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT, ABRIDGED 
EDITION 18 (2d ed. 2005). 
 123. Annexes to the Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established pursuant to 
security Council Resolution 780 (1992), U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1994/674/Add.2 ¶ 
22 (1994). 
 124. Id. ¶ 31. 
 125. Id. ¶ 32. 
 126. Id. ¶ 37. 
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With this type of warfare, the perpetration of crimes during con-
flict is unsurprising.  As noted in the UN report, “[t]he history of war 
clearly reveals that professional armies that are under effective com-
mand and control commit fewer violations than fighting units that are 
not properly trained in the law of armed conflict and are not under 
the effective command and control of superior officers.”127  In the 
Yugoslav conflict in particular, the UN found that “[a]ll of the com-
batant forces . . . have committed grave breaches of the Geneva Con-
ventions and other violations of international humanitarian law for 
which military, and in some cases, civilian commanders are responsi-
ble.”128  Therefore, the ICTY paints JCE liability broadly because that 
tribunal aims to achieve “rapid and effective justice for the victims 
and their associates, who used to perceive as war criminals not the po-
litical and military leaders but the soldiers and the direct perpetra-
tors.”129  Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber has recently rejected 
calls by defendants to limit JCE liability to small-scale operations.130  
Since the groups perpetrating these crimes were by definition unor-
ganized, the inclusion of a structure requirement in JCE liability, 
similar to the requirement in RICO, would defeat the purpose of the 
liability scheme. 
In addition, the ICTY faces considerable problems because it 
seeks to try cases based on the events of a chaotic and decentralized 
war.  Even critics of JCE liability acknowledge that a post-war tribu-
nal faces peculiar evidentiary problems in establishing individual 
criminal liability: “As a practical matter, in the chaotic conditions in 
which war-time violations occur, and due to the post-war dislocation 
experienced by many victims, it is often very difficult to locate specific 
evidence proving that defendants have committed particular crimes.  
Joint criminal enterprise [liability] helps prosecutor[s] secure convic-
tions when such proof may be lacking.”131  Further, unlike the Nurem-
berg Tribunal, the ICTY does not have the benefit of extensive re-
 
 127. Id. ¶ 42. 
 128. Id. ¶ 40. 
 129. Piacente, supra note 6, at 447. 
 130. Prosecutor v. Brdanian, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 423-425 (Apr. 3, 2007).  As 
the court stated, “there is no risk that attaching JCE liability to an individual who is structurally 
remote from the crime increases the possibility of the individual being made guilty by ‘mere as-
sociation’ . . . . because responsibility pursuant to JCE does require participation by the ac-
cused” regardless of the size of the enterprise.  Id. ¶ 424. 
 131. Danner & Martinez, supra note 8, at 133. 
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cord-keeping by the regime whose activities are being punished.132  
Therefore, as one former prosecutor noted, “[t]he amount of infor-
mation immediately available after the establishment of the ICTY led 
the [Office of the Prosecutor] to start indicting and prosecuting 
mainly soldiers, camp commanders, and members of paramilitary 
groups.”133 
Finally, unlike AEDPA, the ICTY primarily seeks to punish 
completed crimes in a past conflict rather than prevent the commis-
sion of new crimes in an ongoing conflict.  Therefore, members of a 
JCE are held responsible for the substantive crimes of other group 
members, rather than for merely supporting the group, as in AEDPA. 
Therefore, in sum, though the JCE doctrine does not mirror simi-
lar schemes in international and domestic law, it is nevertheless le-
gitimate given the goals of the ICTY.  Specifically, the breadth of JCE 
liability may be justified based on the decentralization of the Yugo-
slav conflict, the difficulty of gathering evidence during wartime, and 
the need to punish past crimes rather than prevent new ones.  Though 
the doctrine is controversial, such liability is necessary to allow the 
ICTY to carry out its mission. 
 
 
 132. At the Nuremberg tribunal, documents produced by the German government served as 
the primary evidence.  As stated in a 1946 publication of the Government Printing Office, 
[a]lthough some pieces of evidence [used at the Nuremberg Tribunal] were secured in 
Washington and London, by far the greater part was obtained in the land of the enemy. 
As the American Armies had swept into Germany, military investigating teams had 
filled document centers with an increasing wealth of materials which were freely made 
available by the Army to [Office of the Chief of Council] field investigators. 
Preface to OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COUNSEL FOR PROSECUTION OF AXIS 
CRIMINALITY, 1 NAZI CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSION 1 (1946), available at http://www.ya-
le.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/document/nca_vol1/preface.htm. 
 133. Piacente, supra note 6, at 447. 
